How the Pentagon is adapting to China’s technological rise

It’s been simply over two months since Kathleen Hicks stepped down as US deputy secretary of protection. Because the highest-ranking lady in Pentagon historical past, Hicks formed US navy posture via an period outlined by renewed competitors between highly effective nations and a scramble to modernize protection expertise.  

She’s at the moment taking a break earlier than leaping into her (nonetheless unannounced) subsequent act. “It’s been refreshing,” she says—however disconnecting isn’t simple. She continues to watch protection developments intently and expresses concern over potential setbacks: “New administrations have new priorities, and that’s utterly anticipated, however I do fear about simply stalling out on progress that we have constructed over various administrations.”

Over the previous three many years, Hicks has watched the Pentagon rework—politically, strategically, and technologically. She entered authorities within the Nineties on the tail finish of the Chilly Warfare, when optimism and a perception in world cooperation nonetheless dominated US international coverage. However that optimism dimmed. After 9/11, the main focus shifted to counterterrorism and nonstate actors. Then got here Russia’s resurgence and China’s rising assertiveness. Hicks took two earlier breaks from authorities work—the primary to finish a PhD at MIT and becoming a member of the suppose thank Middle for Strategic and Worldwide Research (CSIS), which she later rejoined to guide its Worldwide Safety Program after her second tour. “By the point I returned in 2021,” she says, “there was one actor—the PRC (Folks’s Republic of China)—that had the potential and the need to essentially contest the worldwide system because it’s arrange.”

On this dialog with MIT Expertise Evaluation, Hicks displays on how the Pentagon is adapting—or failing to adapt—to a brand new period of geopolitical competitors. She discusses China’s technological rise, the way forward for AI in warfare, and her signature initiative, Replicator, a Pentagon initiative to quickly area hundreds of low-cost autonomous techniques akin to drones.

You’ve described China as a “gifted quick follower.” Do you continue to imagine that, particularly given latest developments in AI and different applied sciences?

Sure, I do. China is the most important pacing problem we face, which suggests it units the tempo for many functionality areas for what we want to have the ability to defeat to discourage them. For instance, floor maritime functionality, missile functionality, stealth fighter functionality. They set their minds to reaching a sure functionality, they have an inclination to get there, they usually are inclined to get there even quicker.

That stated, they’ve a considerable quantity of corruption, they usually haven’t been engaged in an actual battle or fight operation in the best way that Western militaries have skilled for or been concerned in, and that may be a large X consider how efficient they’d be.

China has made main technological strides, and the previous narrative of its being a follower is breaking down—not simply in industrial tech, however extra broadly. Do you suppose the US nonetheless holds a strategic benefit?

I might by no means need to underestimate their potential—or any nation’s potential—to innovate organically once they put their minds to it. However I nonetheless suppose it’s a useful comparability to have a look at the US mannequin. As a result of we’re a system of free minds, free folks, and free markets, we now have the potential to generate far more innovation culturally and organically than a statist mannequin does. That’s our benefit—if we will understand it.

China is forward in manufacturing, particularly relating to drones and different unmanned techniques. How massive an issue is that for US protection, and may the US catch up?

I do suppose it’s an enormous drawback. After we have been conceiving Replicator, one of many massive considerations was that DJI had simply jumped approach out forward on the manufacturing aspect, and the US had been left behind. A variety of producers right here imagine they’ll catch up if given the precise contracts—and I agree with that.

However the more durable problem isn’t simply making the drones—it’s integrating them into our broader techniques. That’s the place the U.S. usually struggles. It’s not a sophisticated manufacturing drawback. It’s a techniques integration drawback: how you are taking one thing and make it usable, scalable, and linked throughout a joint power. Replicator was designed to push via that—to drive not simply manufacturing, however integration and deployment at pace.

We additionally hung out figuring out broader supply-chain vulnerabilities. Microelectronics was a giant one. Vital minerals. Batteries. Folks generally suppose batteries are nearly electrification, however they’re elementary throughout our techniques—even on ships within the Navy.

In relation to drones particularly, I truly suppose it’s a solvable drawback. The difficulty isn’t complexity. It’s nearly getting sufficient mass of contracts to scale up manufacturing. If we try this, I imagine the US can completely compete.

The Replicator drone program was one in every of your key initiatives. It promised a really quick timeline—particularly in contrast with the everyday protection acquisition cycle. Was that achievable? How is that progressing?

Once I left in January, we had nonetheless lined up for proving out this summer season, and I nonetheless imagine we should always see some completion this yr. I hope Congress will keep very engaged in making an attempt to make sure that the potential, actually, involves fruition. Even simply this week with Secretary [Pete] Hegseth out within the Indo-Pacific, he made some passing reference to the [US Indo-Pacific Command] commander, Admiral [Samuel] Paparo, having the flexibleness to create the potential wanted, and that provides me quite a lot of confidence of consistency.

Are you able to discuss how Replicator suits into broader efforts to hurry up protection innovation? What’s truly altering contained in the system?

Historically, protection acquisition is gradual and serial—one step after one other, which works for enormous, long-term techniques like submarines. However for issues like drones, that simply doesn’t reduce it. With Replicator, we aimed to shift to a parallel mannequin: integrating {hardware}, software program, coverage, and testing all of sudden. That’s the way you get pace—by breaking down silos and operating issues concurrently.

It’s not about “Transfer quick and break issues.” You continue to have to check and consider responsibly. However this strategy exhibits we will transfer quicker with out sacrificing accountability—and that’s a giant cultural shift.

 How necessary is AI to the way forward for nationwide protection?

It’s central. The way forward for warfare can be about pace and precision—choice benefit. AI helps allow that. It’s about integrating capabilities to create quicker, extra correct decision-making: for reaching navy targets, for lowering civilian casualties, and for having the ability to deter successfully. However we’ve additionally emphasised accountable AI. If it’s not secure, it’s not going to be efficient. That’s been a key focus throughout administrations.

What about generative AI particularly? Does it have actual strategic significance but, or is it nonetheless within the experimental section?

It does have significance, particularly for decision-making and effectivity. We had an effort known as Undertaking Lima the place we checked out use instances for generative AI—the place it is perhaps most helpful, and what the foundations for accountable use ought to appear like. A few of the greatest use could come first within the again workplace—human sources, auditing, logistics. However the potential to make use of generative AI to create a community of functionality round unmanned techniques or info trade, both in Replicator or JADC2? That’s the place it turns into an actual benefit. However these back-office areas are the place I might anticipate to see massive positive factors first.

[Editor’s note: JADC2 is Joint All-Domain Command and Control, a DOD initiative to connect sensors from all branches of the armed forces into a unified network powered by artificial intelligence.]

Lately, we’ve seen extra tech trade figures getting into nationwide protection conversations—generally pushing sturdy political beliefs or advocating for deregulation. How do you see Silicon Valley’s rising affect on US protection technique?

There’s a protracted historical past of innovation on this nation coming from outdoors the federal government—individuals who take a look at massive nationwide issues and need to assist remedy them. That form of engagement is nice, particularly when their technical experience strains up with actual nationwide safety wants.

However that’s not only one stakeholder group. A wholesome democracy contains others, too—staff, environmental voices, allies. We have to reconcile all of that via a functioning democratic course of. That’s the one approach this works.

How do you view the involvement of outstanding tech entrepreneurs, akin to Elon Musk, in shaping nationwide protection insurance policies?

I imagine it’s not wholesome for any democracy when a single particular person wields extra energy than their technical experience or official position justifies. We’d like sturdy establishments, not simply sturdy personalities.

The US has lengthy attracted high STEM expertise from around the globe, together with many researchers from China. However in recent times, immigration hurdles and heightened scrutiny have made it more durable for foreign-born scientists to remain. Do you see this as a menace to US innovation?

I feel you need to be assured that you’ve a safe analysis neighborhood to do safe work. However a lot of the work that underpins nationwide protection that’s STEM-related analysis doesn’t should be tightly secured in that approach, and it actually depends on a various ecosystem of expertise. Slicing off expertise pipelines is like consuming our seed corn. Applications like H-1B visas are actually necessary.

And it’s not nearly worldwide expertise—we want to verify folks from underrepresented communities right here within the US see nationwide safety as an area the place they’ll contribute. In the event that they don’t really feel valued or trusted, they’re much less prone to are available in and keep.

What do you see as the most important problem the Division of Protection faces right this moment?

I do suppose the  belief—or the dearth of it—is a giant problem. Whether or not it’s belief in authorities broadly or particular considerations like navy spending, audits, or politicization of the uniformed navy, that challenge manifests in every part DOD is making an attempt to get accomplished. It impacts our potential to work with Congress, with allies, with trade, and with the American folks. If folks don’t imagine you’re working of their curiosity, it’s laborious to get something accomplished.