With the PDP formally zoning its 2027 presidential ticket to the South,and Bauchi governor Bala Mohammed openly naming Goodluck Jonathan and Peter Obi as options,the conversation has moved from just ordinary talks to actions, but could a unity slate unseat the ruling APC? 

Why is this ticket even on the table

Bauchi governor Bala Mohammed has said the PDP is weighing Goodluck Jonathan and would warmly welcome Peter Obi if he returns, part of a South-first push for 2027.

He has also floated a faith-balanced formula,Southern Christian standard-bearer with a Northern Muslim running mate,as a deliberate contrast to the APC’s 2023 approach. That framing is meant to present inclusion and recalibrate the PDP’s coalition map after the lessons of 2023.

The first hurdle: Can Jonathan legally run again?

A 2018 constitutional alteration introduced Section 137(3), which limits how many times someone who has previously been sworn in to complete another person’s term can be elected president. 

Because Jonathan completed Umaru Yar’Adua’s term in 2010 and then won the 2011 election, any 2027 run would likely invite litigation. Until a clear court ruling lands, a Jonathan-led slate carries legal risk that could distract the campaign or spook funders and allies at critical moments.

The coalition math that matters

Winning the presidency requires both a plurality of votes and at least 25% of the vote in two-thirds of the states and the FCT. The 2023 race showed how a split opposition benefits the incumbent party: 

APC won with about a third of the total vote while PDP and LP carved up the rest. A simple PDP-plus-LP addition looks compelling on paper, but voter transfers are never one-for-one. 

Obi’s 2023 map leaned heavily on the South-East, South-South, Lagos, and parts of the Middle Belt. To actually win in 2027, a Jonathan/Obi-led ticket with a Northern running mate must hold the South comfortably, dominate the North-Central, and register meaningful urban and youth gains in the North-West and North-East to satisfy the spread rule.

The Obi variable

Obi commands an energised youth-urban movement and a grassroots volunteer network that delivered real down-ballot wins in 2023. If he returns to the PDP, part of his base will accept the move as tactical pragmatism; another part may see it as a retreat from the outsider brand that powered their activism. 

Managing that perception is the difference between synergy and attrition. If Obi is number two, he would need visible ownership of core reform planks,power sector delivery, jobs and MSME finance, procurement transparency,to keep volunteers, small donors, and turnout intensity intact.

APC’s built-in advantages

The APC enters 2027 with incumbency, agenda-setting visibility, and sizable legislative muscle. Those advantages shape media narratives, influence ground operations, and help retain elite coalitions. 

If the opposition fields multiple serious candidates or delays unity, the APC benefits from a fragmented vote,just as it did in 2023.

What a winning path looks like

The opposition must de-risk the ticket by securing an early legal determination on Jonathan’s eligibility,well before primaries and fundraising sprints.

In parallel, it needs to lock down the South, then build a durable bridge across the Middle Belt by centring security, inflation relief, and farm-to-market fixes that resonate beyond party lines. 

Urban precincts in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, and Maiduguri should be micro-targeted with issue-based town halls, credible Northern surrogates, and faith-community validators. 

The campaign has to treat the “Obidient” energy as a governing asset: integrate its leaders into policy design and field operations, give the movement measurable milestones to chase, and protect its outsider credibility even under a big-tent PDP umbrella.

Finally, the ticket balance matters; a South-Christian/North-Muslim pairing can widen the conversation and blunt polarisation,provided it’s matched by shared message discipline and a joint economic plan people can visualise in their daily lives.

Risks that could sink it

A courtroom ambush that drags late into 2026 would drain time and attention. A grassroots backlash from LP loyalists could depress turnout in swing metros. Failure to cross the 25% threshold in enough Northern states would imperil the spread requirement even if the raw vote looks close. 

And incumbency headwinds, federal patronage, security optics, and constant visibility will keep the APC competitive even in a tougher economic mood.