President Donald Trump will sit down with the Saudi crown prince and Emirati and Qatari leaders on Could 14, 2025, in what’s being closely touted as a high-stakes summit. Not invited, and watching warily, shall be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Like many different members of his right-wing coalition, Netanyahu appeared delighted on the election of Trump as U.S. president in November, believing that the Republican’s Center East insurance policies would undoubtedly favor Israeli pursuits and be coordinated carefully with Netanyahu himself.
But it surely hasn’t fairly performed out that means. After all, Washington stays – actually in official communications – Israel’s strongest international ally and chief provider of arms. However Trump is selling a Center East coverage that’s, at instances, distinctly at odds with the pursuits of Netanyahu and his authorities.
In truth, in pushing for an Iran nuclear deal – a shock reversal from Trump’s first administration – Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu positions. Such is the extent of alarm in Israeli right-wing circles that rumors have been circulating of Trump asserting unilateral U.S. assist for a Palestinian state forward of the Riyadh go to – one thing that will characterize a transparent departure for Washington.
As a historian of Israel and the broader Center East, I acknowledge that in key methods Trump’s agenda in Riyadh represents a continuation of the U.S. insurance policies, notably in pursuing safety relationships with Arab Gulf monarchies – one thing Israel has lengthy accepted if not overtly supported. However within the course of, the journey may additionally put vital daylight between Trump and Netanyahu.
Trump’s official agenda
The four-day journey to the Gulf, Trump’s first policy-driven international go to since being elected president, is on the floor extra about growing financial and safety ties between the U.S. and conventional allies within the Persian Gulf.
Trump is anticipated to cement commerce offers value tens of billions of {dollars} between the U.S. and Arab Gulf States, together with unprecedented arms purchases, Gulf investments within the U.S. and even the floated Qatari reward of a palatial 747 meant to be used as Air Power One.
There’s additionally the potential of a safety alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
To this point, so good for Israel’s authorities. Previous to the Oct. 7 assaults, Israel was already within the technique of forging nearer ties to the Gulf states, with offers and diplomatic relations established with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain by way of the Abraham Accords that the Trump administration itself facilitated in September 2020. A possible normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia was additionally within the offing.
Coping with Tehran
However central to the agenda this week in Riyadh shall be points the place Trump and Netanyahu are more and more not on the identical web page. And that begins with Iran.
Whereas the nation received’t be represented, Iran will function closely at Trump’s summit, because it coincides with the U.S. administration’s ongoing diplomatic talks with Tehran over its nuclear program. These negotiations have now concluded 4 rounds. And regardless of clear challenges, American and Iranian delegations proceed to venture optimism about the potential of reaching a deal.

Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu by way of Getty Photos
The method marks a change in fact for Trump, who in 2018 deserted an analogous deal to the one he’s now largely trying to forge. It additionally suggests the U.S. is at present against the concept of direct armed confrontation with Iran, towards Netanayhu’s clear choice.
Diplomacy with Tehran can also be favored by Gulf states as a means of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia – Tehran’s long-term regional rival that, like Israel, opposed the Obama-era Iran nuclear diplomacy – is more and more searching for a extra cautious engagement with Iran. In April, the Saudi protection minister visited Tehran forward of the latest U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
Netanyahu has constructed his political profession on the looming risk from a nuclearized Iran and the need to nip this risk within the bud. He unsuccessfully tried to undermine President Barack Obama’s preliminary efforts to succeed in an settlement with Iran – leading to 2015’s Iran nuclear deal. However Netanyahu had extra luck with Obama’s successor, serving to persuade Trump to withdraw from the settlement in 2018.
So Trump’s about-turn on Iran talks has irked Netanyahu – not solely as a result of it occurred, however as a result of it occurred so publicly. In April, the U.S. president referred to as Netanyahu to the White Home and overtly embarrassed him by stating that Washington is pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Tehran.
Break up over Yemen
A transparent indication of the potential stress between the Trump administration and the Israeli authorities may be seen within the ongoing skirmishes involving the U.S., Israel and the Houthis in Yemen.
After the Houthis fired a missile on the Tel Aviv airport on Could 4 – resulting in its closure and the cancellation of a number of worldwide flights – Israel struck again, devastating an airport and different services in Yemen’s capital.
However only a few hours after the Israeli assault, Trump introduced that the U.S. wouldn’t strike the Houthis anymore, as they’d “surrendered” to his calls for and agreed to not block passage of U.S. ships within the Crimson Sea.
It grew to become clear that Israel was not concerned on this new understanding between the U.S. and the Houthis. Trump’s assertion was additionally notable in its timing, and may very well be taken as an effort to calm the area in preparation of his journey to Saudi Arabia. The truth that it would assist easy talks with Iran too – Tehran being the Houthis’ predominant sponsor – was doubtless an element as effectively.
Timing can also be related in Israel’s newest assault on Yemeni ports. They occurred on Could 11 – the eve of Trump setting off for his go to to Saudi Arabia. In so doing, Netanyahu could also be sending a sign not solely to the Houthis but additionally to the U.S. and Iran. Persevering with to assault the Houthis may make nuclear talks harder.
Bibi’s political survival-first method
Important observers of Netanyahu have lengthy argued that he prioritizes continued struggle in Gaza over regional calm for the sake of holding collectively his far-right coalition, members of which want full management of the Gaza Strip and de-facto annexation of the West Financial institution.

Mario Tama/Getty Photos
This, many political commentators have argued, is the principle motive why Netanyahu backed off from the final stage of the ceasefire settlement with Hamas in March – one thing which might have required the withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Gaza Strip.
Because the collapse of the ceasefire, Israel’s military has mobilized in preparation for a renewed Gaza assault, scheduled to begin after the tip of Trump’s journey to the Gulf.
With members of the Netanayhu authorities overtly supporting the everlasting occupation of the strip and declaring that bringing again the remaining Israeli hostages is now not a high precedence, it appears clear to me that deescalation isn’t on Netanyahu’s agenda.
Trump himself has famous just lately each the alarming state of the hostages and the grave humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Now, along with the discharge of Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander, the U.S. can also be engaged in negotiations with Hamas over ceasefire and support – ignoring Netanyahu within the course of.
The underside greenback
Present U.S. coverage within the area might all be serving a higher intention for Trump: to safe billions of {dollars} of Gulf cash for the American economic system and, some have stated, himself. However to realize that requires a secure Center East, and continued struggle in Gaza and Iran inching nearer to nuclear capabilities may disrupt that objective.
After all, a diplomatic settlement over Tehran’s nuclear plans remains to be a way off. And Trump’s international coverage is notably susceptible to abrupt turns. However whether or not guided by a dealmaker’s instincts to pursue commerce and financial offers with rich Gulf states, or by a real – and associated – want to stabilize the area, his administration is more and more pursuing insurance policies that go towards the pursuits of the present Israeli authorities.

